Political Parties in Korea: Moving toward a Stable Party System?

July 24, 2007 [Published in the Korea Herald, Special Series, "Insight into Korea" for the 20th Anniversary of Korean democracy] • To many, if not most, observers of Korean politics, perhaps one of the most vexing problems since the transition to democracy in 1987 has been the erratic nature of party politics. Indeed, throughout the world, few democracies come close to matching the instability and volatility of the South Korean party system-a system that appears to be the epitome of chaos and confusion with short-lived, seemingly unprincipled, poorly disciplined and extraordinarily factious political parties.

Cynics tend to see the instability of party politics in Korea as a product of self-serving, self-aggrandizing politicians and their followers. In this view, political parties are little more than convenient vehicles, or instruments, used to achieve individual political ambitions; thus, once the “party vehicles” outlive their usefulness, they are easily discarded and a new vehicle is chosen or, more typically, created. To be sure, this metaphor is not entirely inaccurate, for it is clear that South Korea's political leaders have exhibited precious little fidelity to particular parties and, even more, to the ideologies the parties supposedly represent. From Kim Young-sam's alliance with the Roh Tae-woo's Democratic Justice Party, to Kim Dae-jung's deal with Kim Jong-pil's United Liberal Democrats, to the recent announcement by former Gyeonggi governor Sohn Hak-kyu to leave the Grand National Party (GNP) and join a breakaway “progressive” group, it is easy to see that many, if not the vast majority of, Korean politicians hold an essentially instrumental view of political parties.

Yet, to place the primary blame for the volatility of Korea's party politics on politicians themselves is, bluntly put, wrongheaded. It is equally misguided to attribute the shortcomings of party politics as a whole to weak, corrupt, or immature parties. To do either is to confuse cause with effect. In other words, the unstable nature of party politics in Korea must be seen, to a very large extent, as a product-an effect-of the larger socio-political, institutional, and even cultural context of which it is a part. As Frank Sorauf and Paul Allen Beck, authors of the classic text Party Politics in America, nicely explain it, political parties “… are in and of the political system, and one cannot expect that they alone among political institutions can escape the influences that shape everything around them." To read more, please click here

Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation

The following entry is a review of Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation by Roland Bleiker (University of Minnesota Press, 2005)

For decades, most, if not nearly all, of the security-related literature on North Korea tended to cover the same basic and very predictable ground. Empirically, we would hear about the difficulty of analyzing the North Korean regime due to a lack of access, to the unreliability of data, or to the sheer opaqueness of the system. Of course, this did not stop scholars and others from pontificating on the inner workings of the North Korean political system and state. This is not to say that such analyses were necessarily unwarranted or misguided. Certainly, there was and there continues to be a very important need to analyze, understand and explain the behavior of the North Korean regime and the dynamics of the system. Unfortunately, the predictability-really, staleness-of the majority of extant analyses are not merely a product of empirical obstacles. Another, arguably, much larger obstacle is the near-total lack of theoretical vision and insight among these studies, the source of which is not difficult to identify. It is, quite simply, the overwhelming dominance of a state-centric and realist approach. Click here to read the rest (available as PDF file).

What is a Korean?

What is a Korean? When I posed this question to a group of students at Chonnam University in the city of Kwangju, I was met with many smiles and more than a few giggles. To these students, there seemed little or no reason to ask such a question. The answer was obvious, so my question seemed funny, if not absurd. If pressed, though, most of the students might have replied that “Koreanness” is an organic and essential, as opposed to a social and contingent, identity. Or at least this is the reasoning tacitly embedded in the notion that one’s identity is based on blood, which is perhaps the most common way that Koreans identify the core element of Koreanness. Most Koreans, of course, also recognize that there are deep cultural and social aspects to Korean identity. In this view, Koreans generally see “race” and culture as one. To be truly Korean, then, one must not only have Korean blood, but also speak the language and embody the values, the mores, and the mind-set of Korean society. This helps explain why ethnic Koreans—from China, Russia, Japan, the United States and other countries throughout the world—do not always fit into Korean society. They are different, “real” Koreans recognize, even if they share the same blood and speak the same language. Indeed, sometimes even the children of expatriate Koreans find it difficult to be fully accepted when they return to Korean society. Click here to read the rest (available as PDF file).

The Migrant Workers' Hospital and Foreign Migrant Workers' House

September 27, 2006 • The Migrant Workers' Hospital (MWH) and Foreign Migrant Workers' House are two of many organizations set up to assist foreign migrant workers in Korea. The MWH, however, is the first and only hospital established specifically to treat foreign workers. It is the product of a great deal of hard work and dedication on the part of Rev. Kim Hae-sung. Rev. Kim was kind enough to sit for an extended interview with me; he also provided a tour of his facilities and encouraged me to take many pictures. I am reproducing some of the photos via an online photo album. Click on the link to see the pictures. Migrant Workers' Hospital and Migrant Workers' House, September 27, 2006 - 28 Photos

An Interview with Shakil

May 23, 2006 • The Migrants' Trade Union (MTU) is a small, but important development in the evolution of international migration in South Korea. It represents an effort by foreign migrant workers--primarily from Bangladesh and Nepal--to establish their own political voice in South Korea. The union is headed by Anwar Hossein. Hossein, however, was violently arrested by Korean immigration authorities on May 14th, 2005, and incarcerated in the Chungjoo detention centre (south of Seoul). He was held for almost a year, but was recently transferred to a hospital due to ill-health. This is most likely a "face-saving" tactic, which will allow immigration authorities to release Anwar for "humanitarian reasons." During his detention, the MTU's vice president, Shakil, was the acting president of the union. The following text is a translation of an interview I had with Shakil on May 22, 2006. Click here to read the interview.

The Filipino Community in Korea

May 16, 2006 • Korea has long been considered a homogenous society, by both Koreans and non-Korean alike. This is beginning to change, though, as more and more foreign workers not only come to take up jobs in Korea, but also start to develop their own communities. While "community formation" is still nascent, there are indications that it is beginning to take root. One indication of this is the street market held every Sunday in front of the Hyehwa Catholic Church on Daehangno in central Seoul. Each week, dozens of Filipino and some Korean vendors gather to sell products "from home" to a primarily Filipino crowd. On a recent Sunday in May (2006) there were about 40 vendors and several hundred shoppers, although, throughout the day, it is possible that several thousand shoppers may show up from around the region (I was told, by one volunteer at the Philippine Community Center, that as many as 3,000 Filipino worshippers show up for Mass given by a Filipino priest, Father Glenn). Altogether, there are about 30,000~35,000 Filipinos living in Korea--most are migrant workers, but a small number came to Korea specifically for the purpose of marriage. Some of these marriages are arranged through "brokers" and some are through "mass weddings" arranged by the Unification Church, which remains influential in Korea. Not surprisingly, many of these marriages end up in abuse, divorce, and even death. (For an academic account of this situation, read this article by Young Hee Kwon.)

• Click here to see some PICTURES of the street market and Hyehwa Catholic Church

• For a related article, see "Foreign Workers Seek Comfort at Korean Churches" (Seoul Times)

The Art of Diplomacy: Ambassador Vershbow and the Free Trade Agreement

May 1, 2006 • Diplomats are usually “diplomatic.” This means, according to the American Heritage Dictionary, “having or showing an ability to deal with people in a sensitive and effective way.” The American Ambassador to Korea, Alexander Vershbow, is both a diplomat and, for the most part, very diplomatic. At the Ilmin International Relations Institute at Korea University on May 1, 2006, Ambassador Vershbow delivered an address on “The Future of US-Korea Relations.” In his speech, he covered a variety of issues: the US-ROK security relationship, ongoing negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Korea and the US, the visa waiver program (which would allow Korean tourists to enter the United States without a visa), the North Korean nuclear issue, and so on. Following his talk, he answered questions from the audience in a generally forthright, but still diplomatic manner. On the highly charged issue of Korean and Japanese claims over a small set of islands called Dokto in Korean (and Takeshima in Japanese), Ambassador Vershbow deftly responded to a comment/question from a Korean member of the audience, who pointedly asked the Ambassador why the United States does not take the “Korean side” on the issue. Although the Ambassador was explicit in saying the US would not take sides, he did so in a manner that neither implied the Korean position was wrong or right. As he explained it, the United States has studied the issue in depth, particularly from the standpoint of international law, and had concluded that there is no clear answer. As such, the United States cannot take a position, and—contrary to reports in the Korean mass media—has decided to stay completely on the sidelines. (The Korean media, Vershbow stressed, erroneously reported that, in his official capacity, he is serving as mediator between Korea and Japan on the issue. But this is simply not the case.) Click here to read the rest of the article.

Tsunami or Ebb Tide? Soft Power and the Limits of the "Korean Wave"

May 1, 2006 • According to Joseph Nye, Asian countries have impressive potential resources for soft power, which he defines as the “power to attract”—that is, the power of getting others to do what you want them to do through emulation or inducement, rather than through force or coercion. To Nye and increasingly to many other observers of world politics—including academics, policymakers, business people and even ordinary citizens—soft power has become almost as important as “hard power,” which rests primarily on physical resources: military forces, population, territory, raw materials and the like. Soft power, by contrast, is based on largely intangible resources such as the attraction of one’s ideas, culture, business practices, intellectual know-how, political and social values, and so on. To Nye, exploiting the potential of these resources is crucial. Countries that do so will exercise greater influence in the world, which, in turn, will allow them to achieve greater security and prosperity for their own citizens. True or not, Nye’s ideas have had a strong impact both within and outside of academia. Indeed, the tremendous interest in the “Korean Wave” (or hallyu) does not merely reflect an expression of national pride (which it certainly does), but also represents a conscious effort—primarily on the part of Korea’s political and economic elite—to expand Korea’s influence in world affairs. In this regard, hallyu can be seen as the cultural or “soft” side of South Korea’s foreign policy. This is not to say that the growing popularity of Korean movies, dramas, and music is a creation of the state. It clearly is not. Rather, it means that the Korean government (and business leaders) are consciously promoting and attempted to co-opt hallyu in many ways in order to build soft power and expand Korea’s influence in the world. Click here to read more.

Hines Ward and the Redefining of Korean Identity

April 2, 2006 [Published in the Korea Times, April 5, 2006] • The issue of “mixed-race” children—brought to the fore by the recent success of Hines Ward, the “Korean-American” athlete who was voted the MVP in Super Bowl XL—has provoked a lot of soul searching among Koreans. It has even inspired one Korean legislator, Kim Choong-whan of the Grand National Party, to introduce a bill designed to promote the welfare of “half-Koreans” (Korea Times, “Mixed-Race Korean Welfare Drive States,” April 1, 2006). Such a bill is long overdue and, if successful, a welcomed step toward mitigating the damaging effects of decades of debilitating social and institutional discrimination and bigotry. No single piece of legislation, however, can come close to resolving the problems of “mixed-race” children in Korea, where the concept of ethnicity is inseparably tied to the purity of “Korean blood.” This is partly reflected in the term “half-Korean” (used in a matter-of-fact way in the Korea Times article), which is premised on the unstated, but taken-for-granted belief that an individual with only one Korean parent cannot be “Korean.” Click here to read more.

A Small Store in Paju, South Korea

March 27, 2006 • The picture of this small store front in Paju city is unremarkable. However, it represents a significant and ongoing change in South Korea. For, it is a picture of store that caters, not to Korean customers, but to a range of foreign residents in Paju, a city of about 230,000. This is evident in the various national flags painted on the store's main sign. The flags represent China, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Indonesia and Singapore. On the left side of the store, moreover, are Chinese characters (called hanja in Korean) that read "Chinese grocercies." We can assume, then, that the main customers for this store come from at least a dozen countries outside of Korea. So what are all these people from across Asia doing in a small Korean town? Most, of course, are working there. They represent a wave of "low skilled" foreign workers that started coming to Korea in the late 1980s and is continuing to grow. Today, there are at least 420,000 foreign workers in Korea, and probably much more than that. This, however, is old news and not my main point. My main point is that the store represents a still unrecognized--and, for many Koreans, unwelcomed--phenomenon. Specifically, it represents the first inklings of permanent settlement in South Korea by culturally and ethnically distinct "minority groups." Koreans have long defined their society as ethnically pure and homogenous, and while this claim has always been subject to some debate, it is unarguably part of the Korean psyche. Indeed, many (but certainly not all) Koreans, while accepting of temporary migration, particularly if it serves the interests of the Korean economy, are profoundly opposed to "immigration"--the long-term or permanent settlement of "outsiders" within Korea. Even more, many Koreans firmly and unquestioningly believe that Korea can avoid becoming a "country of immigration."

Whether or not Korea can avoid becoming a country of immigration is open to debate: to a certain extent only time will tell. It is important to understand, however, that Korea is not unique: other countries have also resisted immigration, but ultimately such resistance proved futile. There are a number of complex reasons for this, one of the most important of which, perhaps, is that denial of permanent settlement generally requires the use of coercion and extreme measures. Among democracies, however, the use of coercion and extreme measures is almost necessarily limited by institutional practices and norms that protect individual rights, including the rights of "non-citizens." Democracies, as well, have legal and constitutional frameworks that allows individuals to challenge effectively unjust treatment by both governmental organs and society at-large.

Korea, of course, is a democracy, even if an imperfect one. Therefore, simply forcing people to leave--people who have lived in Korea for many years, sometimes decades; people who have married and had children; people who have few economic options outside of Korea; and people who have contributed mightily to Korean society through their work and self-sacrifice--will not be an easy thing to do. Nor will it be humane. Almost assuredly, then, Korea will become a de facto country of immigration. It is better, I believe, to recognize this earlier rather than later. It is better to implement sound, rational, and socially just policies now so that future problems can be avoided or at least mitigated.

The picture of the World Food store tells us that "foreign workers" are beginning to grow roots in Korean soil. They are creating communities. They are becoming part of Korean society. It is time for the country to take heed of this change.

Democracy after Democratization: The Korean Case

The following entry is a review of Democracy after Democratization: The Korean Experience by Choi Jang-jip. (Translated by Lee Kyung-hee.) Seoul: Humanitas press, 2005. Pp. 329.

March 14, 2006 [to be published in the Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies] • Korean democracy, according to Choi Jang-jip, is in a deep crisis. Indeed, despite the remarkable and even wondrous transition to democracy achieved in 1987, Choi contends that the momentum for democratization has not only been lost, but is in danger of reversing itself. This is not to say that Korea will slide back into authoritarianism, or at least not the explicit authoritarianism of the Park Chung Hee or Chun Doo Hwan regimes. The danger, instead, is far subtler. The danger, in fact, has already been manifested in the development in South Korea of what Choi calls “conservative democratization.” To Choi, conservative democratization is a democracy largely without substance. It preserves the formal procedures and institutions of democracy—such as regular elections, competition among parties, and universal suffrage—but it fails to provide a basic function of strong democracy, which, as the author explains it, “is to politically express and represent a variety of social conflicts and interests, and thereby organize alternatives to both expand the foundation of public participation and contribute to the stabilization of the political system” (21). With the crisis of Korean democracy as his starting point and central theme, Choi goes on to identify and analyze the basic reasons for the enervation, if not complete evisceration, of South Korea’s democratic hopes and dreams. Click here to read the rest of the review.

Living at the CJ International House

UPDATED April 5 • In a departure from my typical blog entries, I thought I would write a very pratical description of the CJ International House (Korea University, Anam Residence Life). This is designed specifically for college or university faculty who might find themselves teaching or conducting research at Korea University. Click here to read my review.

Rallying for Migrant Worker Rights

February 19, 2006 [Published in the Korea Herald, Feb. 22, 2006] • For longer than a decade, foreign workers in South Korea have been struggling to carve out a decent life. It has been a long struggle, but not a completely empty one. Indeed, since the early 1990s—when “unskilled” foreign workers first started to come to Korea in large numbers—some meaningful change has occurred. Legally, at least, foreign workers in Korea have achieved several important rights, including, with some exceptions, the same basic labor rights as native Korean workers. This applies equally to “illegal” and legal workers. One of the most recent changes occurred in August 2004 with the implementation of a “guest worker” program known as the Employment Permit System (or EPS).

On the surface, the EPS was supposed to rectify the most egregious abuses of foreign workers; indeed, the EPS, for the first time, provided the framework for “unskilled” foreign workers to become legal workers in Korea, with all the rights and “privileges” that implies. Prior to the establishment of the EPS, unskilled foreign workers could only legally enter Korea as “trainees.” The industrial trainee system, however, was a convenient, but obvious lie: it was not designed to provide training, but was, instead, meant to institutionalize and legitimize the systematic exploitation of foreign labor in the small- and medium-sized business sector. This is one reason the trainee system failed to achieve its goal. The majority of foreign workers simply left their “trainee” positions after arriving in Korea, preferring to work “illegally” primarily because it allowed them to receive much higher wages. To the government, however, the illegal status of foreign workers (who at one point constituted upwards of 80 percent of all foreign labor in Korea) did not necessarily represent an urgent problem. After all, without legal status, these workers, too, could be more easily exploited and abused.

In some respects, then, the EPS is an improvement over the old system. Yet, significant problems remain. One of the most salient is that the new system only allows foreign workers to remain in Korea for three consecutive years. Moreover, the EPS does not provide amnesty to foreign workers who have been in Korea longer than that—and some workers have now been in Korea more than 15 years. Many have also gotten married to Korean citizens, had children, and essentially carved out a life for themselves in Korea. The EPS, then, is fundamentally no different from the prior industrial trainee system. That is, it is primarily designed to undermine permanently the political and social power of foreign labor by legislating the invisibility of long-staying foreign workers in Korea.

In this context, a small but dedicated and energetic group of foreign workers have continued their struggle to challenge the status quo. This was evidenced by a small rally held on February 19, 2006 by the Migrants’ Trade Union (a union composed primarily of “illegal” Bangladeshi and Nepalese workers). While sparsely attended—fewer than 150 union members and their supporters—the rally was meant to underscore, from the workers’ perspective, the strong antipathy to the EPS and to other actions of the Korean government, especially the arrest and detention of the MTU’s president, Anwar Hossain. (The arrest took place on May 14, 2005 while Hossain was walking home. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the arrest resulted in violence and serious injury to Hossain—it is reported that 30 immigration officers were assigned to apprehend him. Moreover, to prevent Hossain from communicating with and perhaps organizing other detainees while in detention, he has been kept in isolation.)

The workers’ rally against the EPS is important because the EPS has been hailed by others, including groups representing the interests of foreign workers in Korea, as an important victory. To the MTU this is dangerous. It is dangerous, in part, because it breeds complacency and carries the risk of derailing the hitherto broadly based movement for foreign worker rights in Korea. Unfortunately, there is little to be complacent about, a point brought home by the violent arrest of Anwar Hossain. Hossain’s arrest, in fact, helps to demonstrate and reinforce the basic intention of the Korean government, which, to repeat, is to undermine the political and social power of foreign labor in Korea. Consider this: virtually every member of the MTU is in Korea “illegally.” Immigration officials know this. Nonetheless, the MTU has been able to carry out multiple demonstrations with little or no interference, including a highly publicized sit in at the Korean National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC), which was inspired by the Commission’s decision to uphold the detention of Hossain. The rally on February 19th was no exception. In fact and not without some irony, the MTU was also granted permission to hold a march through some of Seoul’s busiest streets. The police even provided an escort. It is ironic because MTU is an illegal union composed of “illegal” workers. The government, however, chooses to ignore the question of legality most of the time for the most banal of reasons: Korean small- and medium-sized businesses need foreign workers, and the new EPS system simply does not supply sufficient numbers. When particular foreign workers, however, threaten existing arrangements of power, the authorities will step in—and step in with a massive show of force. This is not to say that immigration officials do not go after ordinary workers. They certainly do. But these, too, are done selectively and are designed, not to eliminate illegal migration, but to maintain an environment of fear and powerlessness among foreign workers.

Do Korean authorities have the right to regulate and control immigration? Of course they do. All states have this right and obligation. But the regulation of immigration in an increasingly globalized world requires a more humane and socially just foundation. In particular, Korea can no longer justify a “no settlement” policy. Hundreds, if not thousands, of foreign workers have, in fact, already settled in Korea. But, because of Korea’s draconian immigration regulations, they are can no longer return to their homelands. They can no longer see their parents, siblings, and other relatives. Granted, it is a “choice” they make, but it is choice often determined by dire circumstances. Moreover, it is choice that few people in the wealthier countries of the world are ever forced to confront. Korea has its own choice. It can continue to close its eyes to the fundamental inequity and cruelty of the current immigration system, including the EPS, or it can decide to play a leading role in Asia. The path it is not an easy one, but it ultimately a rewarding one.